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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States reads in
pertinent part:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah reads:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.

iii

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

ANITA CUBA WALKER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 870434-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal follows the conviction of Exploiting
Prostitution, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1953 as amended).

Jurisdiction is conferred on

this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as
amended) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended),
whereby a defendant in a criminal action may take an appeal to the
Court of Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime
other than a first degree or capital felony.

In this case, the

Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered the final judgment
and conviction against Ms. Walker.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1.

Did sufficient evidence exist both factually and as a

matter of law to support the conviction of Exploiting Prostitution
against Ms. Walker, or did the evidence only support a possible
finding on the uncharged crime of Aiding Prostitution?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ms. Walker was charged by Information with Exploiting
Prostitution, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1953 as amended).

Ms. Walker was found

guilty

of that charge following a jury trial which occurred over five days,
March 26, 27, 31 and April 1, 2, 1986.

Judgment and conviction was

entered by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno of the Third Judicial
District Court on May 16, 1986, and Ms. Walker was sentenced to
prison and ordered to pay a fine of $2,500.

The prison sentence was

stayed and Ms. Walker was placed on probation for a period of
eighteen months.

This appeal challenges the validity of the

conviction.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
From 1978 to 1985, Appellant, ANITA WALKER, was lawfully
licensed to operate the business of the Health and Herbs Store
(hereinafter "Health and Herb" or "the Store"), a combination retail
health food store and massage parlor (R. 135 at 24). Ms. Anita
Walker additionally was lawfully licensed as a masseuse to perform
massages at the Health and Herbs Store (R. 135 at 35).
The Store originally opened at 3436 South Main in Salt
Lake County and was moved in 1980 to 360 East 3330 South, also in
Salt Lake County (R. 135 at 24). Health and Herb operated in
compliance with all licensing requirements including annual renewals
of all business and state licenses from its inception in 1978
(R. 135 at 24). Notably, the approval of law enforcement is a
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prerequisite for obtaining original licenses and all such renewals
(R. 135 at 33-34)•

Both Health and Herb and Ms. Walker operated

under their licenses without problem or incident until approximately
mid-1985 (R. 135 at 33-34).

Starting in April of 1985, events

occurred which enmeshed Ms. Walker and Health and Herb in legal
problems.
Antecedent to those problems was the employment of Debbie
Shire at Health and Herb.

Debbie Shire is a felon, a forgery

conviction, who was on probation with the State of Utah and residing
in a halfway house in Salt Lake City (R. 134 at 43; R. 135 at
52-54).

It is the nature and extent of Debbie Shire's employment at

Health and Herb which is the critical issue in this case.
Shortly after Debbie Shire came to Health and Herb, the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office exercised a search warrant on the
premises of the Store on April 5, 1989 (R. 135 at 42-43).

The

search warrant was exercised in conjunction with a police sweep of
Health and Herb and other Salt Lake County massage parlors (R. 132
at 8). The police confiscated two shoe box size boxes of
three-by-five cards and other business records (R. 135 at 43).
Racketing charges were filed against various massage parlors
including Health and Herb and Ms. Walker (R. 132 at 8). All
charges, however, were dismissed against Ms. Walker and Health and
Herb (R. 132 at 8).
On August 9, 1985, Gerald Chatelain paid a visit to
Health and Herb purportedly to verify the employment of Debbie Shire
(R. 135 at 46, 54-55).

Gerald Chatelain works as a "Correctional
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Technician" at the halfway house where Debbie Shire was serving her
commitment with the State of Utah (R. 135 at 46, 52). Gerald
Chatelain refers to himself as a law enforcement officer or a peace
officer (R. 135 at 46, 52), but, on this occasion, he entered Health
and Herb without identifying himself as law enforcement (R. 135 at
57); nor did Gerald Chatelain inquire of Debbie Shire's employment
with Health and Herb (R. 135 at 55, 57-58).

Rather, Gerald

Chatelain testified that Ms. Walker asked him whether he had ever
been in a massage parlor (R. 135 at 48). After he replied that he
had not, he testified that she indicated two types of massages were
available:

one for relaxation and one for pleasure (R. 135 at 48).

Gerald Chatelain indicated that he could not remember her exact
words but that the gist of her explanation was that the relaxation
massage would take about fifteen or twenty minutes, which could then
be followed by a pleasure massage (R. 135 at 48-49).
Gerald Chatelain related further that he was escorted to
what Ms. Walker called the "red room" (R. 135 at 49). While in the
red room, he asked what a pleasure massage was (R. 135 at 49).
Gerald Chatelain testified that Ms. Walker said, "Well, that could
be either a 'hand job' or a 'french,' which is a blow job, as we
call it, or I could 'get laid'" (R. 135 at 49). He indicated the
prices on the massages were $35 for the relaxation massage as
compared to $85 for the pleasure massage (R. 135 at 50).
Gerald Chatelain testified that he told Ms. Walker his
wallet was in the car and he left the Store (R. 135 at 50). Gerald
Chatelain reported the incident to police officers who then screened
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the case with the County Attorney's office electing to file charges
against Ms. Walker for Exploiting Prostitution in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1953 as amended) (R. 10-11; R. 135 at
51).

The Information was filed on August 14, 1985 (R. 10-11).

A

warrant of arrest was prepared for Ms. Walker (R. 03) and she was
placed under arrest and held pending bail (R. 09).
On August 15, 1985, Detective Julian of the Salt Lake
City Police Department entered Health and Herb with marked money and
had a conversation with Debbie Shire, who agreed to perform sex acts
in return for money; once she accepted the marked money, she was
arrested and charged with Prostitution (R. 134 at 6; R. 135 at 10).
Those charges, however, were dropped and immunity granted to her in
exchange for her testimony against Anita Walker (R. 134 at 62-63;
R. 135 at 10) .
At the preliminary hearing, Ms. Walker moved to dismiss
the charge against her for lack of evidence; the circuit court
denied the motion and bound over the case for trial (R. 04). In the
district court, Ms. Walker moved to quash the bindover, challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting the charge in the
Information was improperly pleaded without an allegation of
regularity, and insisting the crime charged repeated a crime with
lesser punishment (R. 134A at 3-4; R. 132 at 4-5, 10-11).

The court

denied the motions (R. 132 at 17). However, those motions were
reasserted during the trial (R. 134 at 76-77) but again were all
denied (R. 134 at 78). Notably, the court did not permit evidence
of the undercover arrest of Debbie Shire to be introduced into
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evidence as it followed the date of the Information and, in part,
because notice to the defense had been withheld on that critical
information (R. 134 at 29-30).
A negotiated plea agreement was offered (R. 132 at 13),
but following the failure of the negotiation, the case against
Ms. Walker proceeded to trial.

After impaneling jurors (R. 135A),

the first two days of trial were spent out of the jury's presence in
chambers going over the testimony of Debbie Shire as it related to
the three-by-five cards originally taken from Health and Herb in
April of 1985 (R. 132; R. 133). The court determined that, of the
two hundred to four hundred cards contained in the two boxes seized
from the Health and Herb Store, Debbie Shire would only be permitted
to testify regarding twenty of the cards of which she had personal
knowledge and recollection (R. 133 at 98-100, 173).
Debbie Shire testified that in late February of 1985, she
interviewed with Ms. Walker for a job at Health and Herb (R. 132 at
33; R. 135 at 104-05).

She maintained that she was hired as a

prostitute and that Ms. Walker explained to her the use of a
three-by-five card filing system (R. 132 at 33-34; R. 135 at
107-10).

Debbie Shire testified that Ms. Walker informed her that

she would have to perform hand jobs, blow jobs, and straight lays
for the price of $40, $60, and $80, respectively (R. 135 at 108).
Debbie Shire testified that she was instructed to pay Ms. Walker $20
for each hand job, $25 for each blow job, and $35 for each lay that
she performed; Debbie Shire was to retain the balance (R. 135 at
111-12).

Ms. Walker purportedly told Debbie Shire that each
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customer's name was to be logged on the cards and markings placed on
the cards representing the acts performed (R. 135 at 108-09).
Debbie Shire explained that a "little 4" would represent a hand job,
a "slanted slash" would represent a blow job, and a "straight slash"
would symoblize a lay (R. 135 at 116). Additionally, the date and a
numerical figure were to be placed on the card to reference the
money she would give to Ms. Walker for the act performed (R. 135 at
133).
Debbie Shire indicated her employment at Health and Herb
required her to apply for a masseuse license and that she lease
space from Ms. Walker (R. 133 at 114-15, 129-30).

Later, exhibits

were introduced indicating that Ms. Walker paid her in checks rather
than a division of cash (R. 133 at 128-30).

Debbie Shire also

testified that she, not Ms. Walker, made all decisions concerning
her prostitution activities including whether to perform a sex act,
with whom she would perform the act, when she would perform the act,
and the type of activity (R. 134 at 61-62).
Debbie Shire indicated that she also had control to vary
the fees she would charge for each of the acts contrary to her
earlier testimony that Ms. Walker established the prices (R. 134 at
61-62.).

Debbie Shire testified in chambers that Ms. Walker did not

control, manage, supervise, or own her as a prostitute (R. 133 at
112-13).

Further, she indicated that the business at Health and

Herb was a legitimate massage business and that she herself gave
"real" massages as expected with the business (R. 133 at 112; R. 134
at 64-66).
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Later, in front of the jury, Debbie Shire described her
behavior as follows:
I was committing acts of prostitution and taking
the money resulting from the acts and giving it to
Anita Walker as she required me to do in her
original conversation. And I was recording the
information on the index cards as she required me
to do in the original conversation.
(R. 134 at 38). Debbie Shire admitted this answer was rehearsed
with the prosecutor and put to memory (R. 134 at 40).
The State rested its case against Ms. Walker following
Debbie Shire's testimony (R. 134 at 69). The defense then
immediately rested as well (R. 134 at 69). The defense moved for a
directed verdict (R. 134 at 76) which was denied by the court
(R. 134 at 78). The trial court met with counsel in chambers and
instructions were prepared and argued (R. 134 at 70). Ms. Walker
excepted to several of the instructions given by the trial court
including the giving of two defense-requested instructions presented
in the alternative, Instructions Nos. 3 and 9 (R. 134 at 73-76).
Following closing arguments, the case was submitted to
the jury, who ultimatey returned with a guilty verdict after almost
ten hours of deliberation (R. 30; R. 134 at 80). This appeal
followed.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence presented at Ms. Walker's trial was
inadequate to support a conviction of Exploiting Prostitution.
State was unable to present necessary facts to establish all
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The

elements of the crime and at best provided evidence of the crime of
Aiding Prostitution.

That crime was uncharged, however, and

Ms. Walker did not request that jurors be instructed on the lesser
charge.

Therefore, the conviction of Exploiting Prostitution must

be dismissed and the case remanded ordering the charge be dismissed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF
EXPLOITING PROSTITUTION AGAINST MS. WALKER.
At the preliminary hearing in this case, Ms. Walker moved
to dismiss the charge against her for lack of evidence; the motion
to dismiss was denied (R. 04-05).

At the arraignment in district

court, Ms. Walker again moved to quash the bindover for lack of
evidence (R. 134A at 2-3). The court denied the motion, noting that
the motion could be reasserted prior to the trial (R. 134A at 3).
Prior to trial, Ms. Walker renewed the motion to dismiss
(R. 132 at 4), and the court denied the motion (R. 132 at 17).
Following the presentment of the State's case, Ms. Walker moved to
dismiss the charge inasmuch as the State had failed to prove the
essential elements of Exploiting Prostitution (R. 134 at 76). The
trial court again denied the motion (R. 134 at 78). The case
against Ms. Walker was submitted to the jurors, who, after
deliberating for nearly ten hours, returned with a guilty verdict
against Ms. Walker (R. 30; R. 134 at 80). Ms. Walker took exception
to the verdict and now appeals that finding, insisting that the
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evidence adduced at her trial is incapable of sustaining the
conviction of Exploiting Prostitution.

Ms. Walker requests this

Court to reverse that erroneous conviction and order that the charge
against her be dismissed.
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the
Utah Supreme Court stated, " [Notwithstanding the presumption in
favor of the jury's decision, this Court still has the right to
review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict."
Further, the Court noted:
We reverse the jury's conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime for which he was convicted.
Id.

This Court has adopted this very same standard for reviewing

cases for the sufficiency of the evidence.

See, e.g., State v.

Garcia, 744 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah App. 1987).

This standard of

review restates the well-recognized state and federal due process
requirements prohibiting a criminal conviction in any case except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988).
The State charged Ms. Walker with Exploiting
Prostitution, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1953 as amended) (R. 10). That statute reads:
76-10-1305. Exploiting prostitution. (1) A
person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he:
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(e) Owns, controls, manages, supervises, or
otherwise keeps, alone or in association with
another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution
business.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1953 as amended).

The Statefs

evidence cannot support that Ms. Walker committed the crime of
Exploiting Prostitution, neither factually nor as a matter of law.
The facts of this case do not rise to the level of
Exploiting Prostitution and, even when viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, requires that this Court find that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that she
committed the crime charged against her.

(See subpoint A, infra.)

As a matter of law, if the evidence supports the
commission of any crime at all, the crime committed was not the
third degree felony of Exploiting Prostitution but, rather, was the
crime of Aiding Prostitution, a class B misdemeanor.

(See

subpoint B, infra.)
A. THE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF
EXPLOITING PROSTITUTION.
The prosecution called four witnesses in its case against
Ms. Walker.
The first witness, Allen Rogers, provided testimony which
established that Ms. Walker was a licensed masseuse and that Health
and Herb was a licensed business to provide Swedish massages and to
retail health food and herbs.

This witness established that

Ms. Walker and the Store were lawfully licensed—complete with
annual police checks authorizing renewals—as a masseuse and a
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legitimate business.

Mr. Rogers testified that the licenses were in

good standing (R. 135 at 33-34).

He testified that not only did he

not have any information that Ms. Walker owned, controlled, managed,
supervised, or otherwise kept a house of prostitution (R. 135 at
34), but, rather, that the licensings demonstrated that she operated
a legitimate business (R. 135 at 35).
The second witness was James Upton, a special
investigator for the Salt Lake City Sheriff's Office assigned as a
vice officer (R. 135 at 39-40).

His testimony established that on

April 5, 1985, he executed a search warrant at the Health and Herb
Store (R. 135 at 40-41).

Mr. Upton testified that he seized a

spiral notebook and two boxes of several hundred three-by-five cards
(R. 135 at 43). His testimony was limited to that statement and to
identifying the two shoe box size boxes as those he had confiscated
from Health and Herb.
The third witness, Gerald Chatelain, Jr., identified
himself as a "correctional technician" in charge of security at a
residential community release program (R. 135 at 46). Later, he
stated his role as a correctional technician was comparable to a law
enforcement or peace officer (R. 135 at 46, 52). He testified that
his duties included the care of Debbie Shire, a resident of the
halfway house (R. 135 at 46). Gerald Chatelain told the jurors that
on August 9, 1985, at 9:45 p.m., he went to the Health and Herb
Store to verify Debbie Shire's employment (R. 135 at 46, 54-55).

On

arriving at Health and Herb, he did not inquire of Debbie Shire nor
mention his name or who he was; rather, he testified that Ms. Walker
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approached him and asked whether he had ever been to a massage
parlor (R. 135 at 48, 55, 57-58).

He noted that he had not (R. 135

at 48). Indicating that he did not recollect the exact
conversation, Gerald Chatelain recalled that Ms. Walker had stated,
"Well, we have two types of massages:

one for relaxation and one

for pleasure" (R. 135 at 48). Gerald Chatelain indicated that
Ms. Walker continued to explain that "the massage for relaxation was
an acupressure to relax me and make me feel good" and would take
between fifteen and thirty minutes (R. 135 at 48). Gerald Chatelain
explained that Ms. Walker next informed him that after the
relaxation massage, if he wanted, he could have a pleasure massage
(R. 135 at 48).
At that juncture, Ms. Walker did not explain the
distinction between the two massages.

Gerald Chatelain testified

that she next accompanied him to a back room, which he described as
the "red room," introducing him to two women—a young female about
twenty-two or twenty-three years old and an "older woman"
approximately fifty-five years of age.

He testified that Ms. Walker

explained that the older woman would perform the relaxation massage
and that afterwards, if he wanted the pleasure massage, the younger
woman would do the pleasure massage.

At that point, Gerald

Chatelain asked, "Well, what is a pleasure massage?"

He testified

that Ms. Walker stated in response, "Well, that could be either a
'hand job1 or a 'French' which is a blow job, as we call it, or I
could 'get laid.1"

Gerald Chatelain indicated that those were the

specific terms utilized by Ms. Walker (R. 135 at 49). Gerald
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Chatelain indicated that Ms. Walker did not elaborate further other
than to indicate that the relaxation massage would cost $35 and the
pleasure massage would cost $85 (R. 135 at 50).1
On cross-examination, Gerald Chatelain corrected that he
was not actually introduced to two women but he did see two women,
not within the "red room" but down the hall (R. 135 at 58, 77-78,
90-91).

Additionally, Gerald Chatelain gave detailed descriptions

of the "red room"—later that description was substantially
contradicted by the testimony of Debbie Shire (compare R. 135 at
78-83 with R. 134 at 66-68).
Following the description of the distinction between the
two types of massages, Gerald Chatelain indicated to Ms. Walker that
he had left his wallet in the car and that he would retrieve it;
however, Gerald Chatelain left the premises and did not return
(R. 135 at 50). He did, however, report the incident to the police.
The fourth witness was Debbie Shire.

Debbie Shire was

hailed by the prosecutor in his opening statement as the State's
critical witness (R. 135 at 9). The prosecutor conceded that Debbie
Shire was a prostitute with a prior felony conviction (R. 135 at
9-10).

She had been convicted of Forgery and was residing in a

halfway house under the supervision of the State Department of
Corrections (R. 134 at 43; R. 135 at 52-54).

Debbie Shire notably

1 A dispute exists as to the price of the pleasure
massage. At both his preliminary hearing and in the report, the
price was indicated as $80; at trial, he testified that the value of
the pleasure massage would be $85 (R. 135 at 83).
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was caught by police officers who had appeared at Health and Herb on
August 15, 1985 and had given her marked money.

She was charged

with Prostitution and potentially faced charges as an accessory to
Ms. Walker for Exploiting Prostitution, but those charges were
dropped in exchange for her testimony against Ms. Walker.

She was

granted immunity (R. 134 at 6, 62-63; R. 135 at 10).
Debbie Shire testified that in February of 1985, she met
with Ms. Walker in a job interview and was hired as a prostitute.
She explained that at that meeting, with no others present,
Ms. Walker explained to her that her duties were to be a
prostitute.

Debbie Shire further claimed that Ms. Walker had

explained the three-by-five card system in detail, indicating
specific prices to be charged and notations to be made on the cards
(R. 132 at 33-34; R. 135 at 104-05, 107-10).

Notably, Debbie Shire

also testified that to obtain employment at Health and Herb, she was
required to file for an apprentice masseuse license with the State
of Utah.

Further, she indicated that she was to lease space from

Ms. Walker and be paid by check rather than a division of cash
(R. 133 at 114-15, 128-30).
During two days of testimony in the judge's chambers,
Debbie Shire was examined and cross-examined regarding the card
filing system.

From the two hundred to four hundred index cards

obtained in the search of Health and Herb in April 1985, Debbie
Shire was only able to identify twenty of those cards as ones which
she was able to recognize as her annotations of sexual acts she had
performed (R. 134 at 50). She testified that in these twenty cards,
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different acts of prostitution were performed by her on various male
patrons.
Importantly, Debbie Shire testified that the Health and
Herb was a real massage parlor where legitimate massages were given
to patrons.

Debbie Shire indicated that she had both given and

received legitimate massages on numerous occasions (R. 133 at 112;
R. 134 at 64-66).

She testified that at no time did Ms. Anita

Walker own, control, manage, supervise, or otherwise keep her as a
prostitute (R. 133 at 112-13).

She indicated that at all times she

had the ability to decide of her own volition whether to participate
in acts of prostitution, and, despite having testified that the
prices were originally set by Ms. Walker, Debbie Shire indicated
that, at her discretion, she could either raise or lower those
prices (R. 134 at 61-62).

It is noteworthy that when Officers

Julian and Forte caught her with the marked money to be exchanged
for acts of prostitution on August 15, 1985, Ms. Walker was not even
present in the building (R. 134 at 11). Consistent with that
scenario, Debbie Shire was unable to connect Ms. Walker to the
twenty three-by-five cards that were introduced into evidence other
than through the allegation that it was Ms. Walker who explained to
her how the three-by-five card system was to be kept and what
symbols were to be utilized on the cards (R. 134 at 53-56).
Significantly, Debbie Shire's testimony in chambers,
indicating Ms. Walker had not owned, managed, controlled, or
supervised her, was contradicted when she took the witness stand
before the jury.

There she twice testified as follows:
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I was committing acts of prostitution and taking
the money resulting from the acts and giving it to
Anita Walker as she required me to do in her
original conversation. And I was recording the
information on the index cards as she required me
to do in the original conversation (R. 134 at 38)
(Cf. R. 134 at 32-33).
Defense counsel noted that she had used this same wording on the two
occasions and asked whether she had been coached by the prosector
(R. 134 at 38-40).

Debbie Shire admitted that this change in

testimony was rehearsed with the prosecutor and put to memory
(R. 134 at 40).
Following the testimony of Debbie Shire, the State rested
its case against Ms. Walker (R. 134 at 69). The defense immediately
rested as well and moved the court for a directed verdict which the
court denied (R. 134 at 69, 76, 78). The denial of that motion was
erroneous.
The testimony of these four witnesses falls short of
sustaining a conviction for Exploiting Prostitution.

The most

damaging evidence against Ms. Walker comes from the final two
witnesses, Debbie Shire and Gerald Chatelain.

The credibility of

both witnesses was aggressively attacked by defense counsel who
demonstrated that (1) Debbie Shire had a stake in the outcome of the
case as she was offered immunity in exchange for her testimony,
further noting the one occasion where she, herself, admitted that
she had rehearsed her testimony with the prosecutor and put that
testimony to memory, and (2) Gerald Chatelain had police officer
interest in the case and was unable to recall details from the event
or his own prior testimony.
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Gerald Chatelain was examined in detail regarding this
observations of the physical facilities of Health and Herb and
specifically the "red room."

He testified that the appearance of

the Store was that of a whorehouse; yet, he conceded that he had
never been in a whorehouse and that the layout was consistent with
massage area he had seen (R. 135 at 69). Also noteworthy is that
Gerald Chatelain admitted to being red-green color-blind conceding
that he could not distinguish any colors in the room (R. 135 at
78-79).

Gerald Chatelain also testified that the "red room"

contained a wash basin and a dressing table (R. 135 at 80).
However, Debbie Shire's testimony clarified that no wash basin nor
dressing table are present in the back room ("red room"), only a
closet for massage supplies, i.e., lotion and towels (R. 134 at
66-67; R. 135 at 81).
In short, the testimonies of both Gerald Chatelain and
Debbie Shire demonstrate bias and can be likened to the testimony
Mrs. H. in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), where the
Supreme Court noted that the "testimony exhibited a strong
motivation to distort her recollection . . . in order to ensure a
conviction."

Id. at 197. This Court should similarly find the

testimonies of Gerald Chatelain and Debbie Shire as lacking
reliability and insufficient as a basis for conviction.
Even accepting the testimonies of these two witnesses a
face value, the testimony presented

still falls short of the

requisite evidence needed to establish the elements of Exploiting
Prostitution.

The Utah Supreme Court has noted:
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The fabric of evidence against the defendant must
cover the gap between the presumption of innocence
and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its
duty to review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court
will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it
will go. But this does not mean that the court
can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap
in order to sustain a verdict. The evidence,
stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45. This Court has agreed.
State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d at 1030 (citing State v. Petree) . The
evidence presented at trial by the State required the jury to
deliberate for nearly ten hours before reaching a verdict
(R. 30; R. 134 at 80). Even then, the verdict of guilty of
Exploiting Prostitution required the jurors to speculate and assume
the presence of evidence missing from the State's case.

This Court

cannot tolerate that those gaps be crossed by speculation or
otherwise be ignored.
The elements of Exploiting Prostitution are indicated as
owning, controlling, managing, supervising, or otherwise keeping a
house of prostitution or a prostitution business.

Notably, it was

established at trial that "Health and Herb" was a legitimate
business which did operate to give legitimate massages and dispense
health food and herbs.

Therefore, it is questionable whether under

the statute an allegation from a lone prostitute that she performed
acts of prostitution at the location of a legitimate business
establishes that the building is a prostitution business or a house
of prostitution.
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A fatal flaw in the State's case was the failure to have
proven that Ms. Walker was connected with the acts of prostitution
by Debbie Shire.

The at-trial testimony against Ms. Walker,

examined in the light most favorable to the verdict, at best
established only that Ms. Walker hired Debbie Shire to perform sex
acts and/or that she attempted to provide such services to a patron
on one occasion.
The testimony supporting both assertions, as noted above,
is wholly suspect.

Nonethless, assuming that Ms. Walker committed

either or both acts, the elements of Exploiting Prostitution were
not met.

Offering to procure a prostitute or prostitution services

for a patron is not Exploiting Prostitution; rather, both are
distinct acts prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304 entitled
Aiding Prostitution.

That crime is defined as follows:

(1) A person is guilty of aiding prostitution if
he:
(a) Solicits a person to patronize a
prostitute; or
(b) Procures or attempts to procure a
prostitute for a patron; or
(c) Leases or otherwise permits a place
controlled by the actor, alone or in association
with another, to be used for prostitution or the
promotion of prostitution; or
(d) Solicits, receives, or agrees to receive
any benefit for doing any of the acts prohibited
by this subsection.
(2) Aiding prostitution is a class B misdemeanor,
provided that a second conviction under this
section shall be a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304 (1953 as amended).

Accordingly, the

facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution in
this case, fall short of the crime of Exploiting Prostitution and
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more closely align with the crime of Aiding Prostitution.

Notably,

not one witness for the State was able to provide evidence that
Ms. Walker owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept
a house of prostitution or a prostitution business.

Debbie Shire

herself denied it, noting that the business was a legitimate massage
parlor.

She further denied that Ms. Walker owned, controlled,

managed, or supervised her prostitution acts; and critically, the
few three-by-five cards she could identify did not tie in Ms. Walker
to the acts.

As such, this Court must find that reasonable minds

must have entertained a reasonable doubt that Ms. Walker committed
the crime of Exploiting Prostitution.
B. AS A MATTER OF LAW, MS. WALKER'S CONVICTION OF
EXPLOITING PROSTITUTION MUST BE VACATED AND THE
CHARGE DISMISSED.
If this Court finds the evidence sufficient to support a
conviction for Exploiting Prostitution, Ms. Walker insists that
reversal of her conviction is warranted as a matter of law.
Throughout this case, pretrial and trial alike, Ms. Walker
continually challenged the inappropriateness of the charge of
Exploiting Prostitution.

She urged that the crime charged was

without a factual basis and also that it duplicated the crime of
Aiding Prostitution codified at Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304 (1953 as
amended).
The two statutes are stated as follows:
76-10-1305. Exploiting Prostitution.—(1) A
person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he:
(e) Owns, controls, manages, supervises, or
otherwise keeps, alone or in association with
- 21 -

another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution
business.
(2) Exploiting prostitution is a felony of the
third degree.
76-10-1304. Aiding Prostitution.—(1) A person is
guilty of aiding prostitution if he:
(a) Solicits a person to patronize a prostitute; or
(b) Procures or attempts or procure a prostitute
for a patron; or
(c) Leases or otherwise permits a place controlled
by the actor, alone or in association with
another, to be used for prostitution or the
promotion of prostitution; or
(d) Solicits, receives, or agrees to receive any
benefit for doing any of the acts prohibited by
this subsection.
(2) Aiding prostitution is a class B misdemeanor,
provided that a second conviction under this
section shall be a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305 and § 76-10-1304 (1953 as amended),
respectively.

Notably, in 1974, the Legislature amended both

statutes by taking the current subsection (l)(e) of § 76-10-1305
(Exploiting Prostitution) from an enumerated subsection of
§ 76-10-1304 (Aiding Prostitution).

See Compiler's Notes to both

sections accompanying the statutes in Addendums A and B,
respectively.

The act of owning, controlling, managing,

supervising, or otherwise keeping, alone or in association with
another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business was
raised in severity from a class B misdemeanor to a third degree
felony without any significant change in language.

This legislative

change blurred the distinction between the two statutes and actually
now subjects the same behavior to punishment under either statute.
In State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), the Supreme
Court addressed the problem of duplicative statutes ruling that
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where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of
two punishments is applicable to an offense, an
accused is entitled to the benefit of the lesser.
Id. at 148. Ms. Walker urged that she be given the benefit of the
lesser punishing statute, but both the prosecutor and the court
refused to remedy her concern.

She now insists that this Court, on

review, recognize that the statutes are duplicative and thereby
grant her relief.
For further support of this claim, Ms. Walker notes that
several of the instructions given to the jury buttress her
position.

From the inception of her case, opposing counsels

differed as to whether the actions described in § 76-10-1305(1)(e)
(owns, controls, manages, etc.) required proof of each as a group or
whether proof of just one would suffice (R. 132 at 14-15).

Jury

instructions were requested by both parties outlining their
respective positions.

Unfortunately, over the objections of defense

counsel (R. 134 at 73-76), contradictory instructions were given to
the jurors representing both views (compare defendant's requested
jury Instruction No. 3 with No. 9). The jurors therefore
encountered confusion over this question and sent out a request for
guidance to the court which was unsatisfactorily answered (R. 107).
Ms. Walker suggests that the jurors could then have found just one
act as the basis for convicting her and insists that when each act
itself is compared with the element of Aiding Prostitution,
§ 76-10-1304, an even greater example of duplication between the
statutes is arguably present.

Compare that portion of

subsection (e) which states "or otherwise keeps, alone or in
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association with another, a house of prostitution" with
§ 76-10-1304(1)(c), "leases or otherwise permits a place controlled
by the actor, alone or in association with another, to be used for
prostitution."
Accordingly, Ms. Walker requests that this Court find
that the statutes are sufficiently duplicative to warrant relief
under State v. Shondel and that the conviction against her must be
vacated.

Notably, however, Ms. Walker does not believe the record

reflects nor demands that the Court impose upon her a conviction for
the lesser crime of Aiding Prostitution.

She relies on Utah Code

Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1953 as amended) to support that position.

That

section reads:
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict
or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or
certiorari, shall determine that there is
insufficient evidence to support a conviction for
the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included
offense and the trier of fact necessarily found
every fact required for conviction of that
included offense, the verdict or judgment of
conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1953 as amended) (emphasis added).
Noticeably, this statute requires that the relief of imposing a
conviction on the lesser charge be requested by Ms. Walker.
does not seek that relief.

She

Ms. Walker notes that motions were made

to encourage the prosecutor and/or court to reduce the charge to
Aiding Prostitution (R. 132 at 10-17), but such attempts were
rebuffed by both (R. 132 at 16, 17). Ms. Walker, therefore, went to
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trial on the greater charge, opting to force the State to prove each
and every element of its case, as was her right.

See Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Ms. Walker did not request a lesser included instruction to provide
for such a verdict (R. 134 at 72), firmly believing, as now urged on
appeal, that no support existed to establish the elements of
Exploiting Prostitution.
The case of State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah
1985), addresses this issue and is instructive.

In Bolsinger, a

majority of the Utah Supreme Court held that there was insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for Murder in the Second Degree as
had been charged against the defendant.

The Court noted, however,

that sufficient evidence existed to support a conviction for the
included offense of Manslaughter.

The Court, in relying on

§ 76-1-402(5), then sua sponte remanded the case to the trial court,
directing the lower court to set aside the verdict and to enter a
judgment of conviction on the lesser charge without the necessity of
a new trial.

Id. at 1221. Justice Stewart dissented from that

decision, noting the necessity that a defendant request the remedy
of a judgment of conviction on the lesser charge thereby avoiding a
new trial. The majority, however, pointed out that, at trial, the
jury had been given an instruction on Manslaughter at the
defendant's request and that impliedly, the defendant had therefore
consented to the reduction they imposed.

Id. at 1221.

The facts in this case are distinct from those in
Bolsinger.

As indicated above, Ms. Walker, unlike Bolsinger, did
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not request such a remedy and explicitly does not now request that
remedy.

Thus, her situation is distinct from the Supreme Courtfs

actions in State v. Bolsinger, necessitating that following this
Court's decision to vacate the conviction of Exploiting
Prostitution, the case be remanded to the lower court with an order
dismissing the charge against her.

CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Walker
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction imposed
against her and remand the case to the district court ordering that
the case be dismissed.
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ADDENDUM A

76-10-1305. Exploiting prostitution.—(1) A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he:
(a) Procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house
of prostitution for one who would be an inmate; or
(b) Encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to
become or remain a prostitute; or .
(c) Transports a person into or within this state with a purpose to
promote that person's engaging in prostitution or procuring or paying for
transportation with that purpose; or
(d) Not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute, shares the
proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their understanding
that he is to share therein.
(e) Owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone
or in association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution
business.
(2) Exploiting prostitution is a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1305, enacted by
•L. 1973, ca. 196, § 76-10-1305; L. 1974, ch.
32, § 30.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1974 amendment substituted "dependent" for "defendant" in subd. (1)
( d ) ; and rewrote subd. ( l ) ( e ) which read:
"Owns, operates, manages, or otherwise
controls a house of prostitution."

ADDENDUM B

76-10-1304. Aiding prostitution.—(1) A person is guilty of aiding
prostitution if he:
(a) Solicits a person to patronize a prostitute; or
(b) Procures or attempts to procure a prostitute for a patron; or
(c) Leases or otherwise permits a place controlled by the actor, alone
or in association with another, to be used for prostitution or the promotion, of prostitution; or
(d) Solicits, receives, or agrees to receive any benefit for doing any
of the acts prohibited by this subsection.
(2) Aiding prostitution is a class B misdemeanor, provided that a
second conviction under this section shall be a class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1304, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-10-1304; L. 1974, ch.
32, §29.
Compiler's 2Totes.
The 1974 amendment deleted former
subd. ( l ) ( a ) which read: "Owns, controls,
manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps,
alone or in association with another, a
house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or'-'; redesignated former subds. (1)
(b) to ( l ) ( e ) as ( l ) ( a ) to ( l ) ( d ) ; and
made minor changes in phraseology and
punctuation.

